2Michael Kors Going . respect to the liquor traffic has been to increase the restrictions placed thereon and to grant and extend the privilege of local option. And we hold that extending such privilege to cities not previously possessing It In no way contravenes the public policy of the state as determined by its p rior legislation, and that a city of the first, second, or third class which adopts a homerule charter under the legislative power conferred upon it by the Constitution and laws may provide therein that such city may determine for itself whether the sale of intoxicating liquor shall be prohibited within its borders Relator further contends that even if the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor may be given to a city of the first class by a homerule charter, yet the charter In question does not confer uch power. This charter differs from the usual form of city charters in that the powers granted are conferred by general provisions only, and that it makes no attempt to enumerate or set forth in detail theMichael Kors specific powers which the city may exercise. The grant of power is as follows:Save as herein otherwise provided and save as prohbited by the Constitution or statutes of the state of Minnesota, it shall have and exercise all powers, functions, rights and privileges possessed by the city of Duluth prior to the adoption of this charter; also all powers, functions, rights and privileges now or hereafter given or granted to municipal corporations of the first ciass having 'ho me rule charters' by the Constitution and laws of the state of Minnesota; also all powers, functions, rights and privileges usually exercised by, or which are incidental to, or inhere in, municipal corporations of like power and degree; also all municipal power, functions, rights, privileges and immunities of every name and nature w rter.The power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor was not conferred by the first clause for it is conceded that the city did not possess such power prior to the adoption of the present charter. It is not conferred by the second or third clauses for there is no general law granting such power to cities of the first class, and it has not been exercised by, and Is not incidental to, and does not inhere in, such cities. The fourth clause grunts all municipal power of every kind . and nature whatsoeMichael Kors Outlet ver. What is meant by all municipal power is not denned, but as here used the expression is obviously broad enough to Include all those powers which are generally recognized as powers which may properly be given to and be exercised by municipal corporations. That it is generally recognized that the power to prohibitthe liquor traffic within their respective territorial limits may properly be conferred upon and be exercised by the subordinate municipalities of the state is evidenced by the uniform trend of legislation and of Judicial decisions both in this state and elsewhere; and we think that the grant of all municipal power of every name and nature whatsoever conferred the power to prohibit the liquor traffic, unless the limitations found in the former charter still preclude the city from prohibiting such traffic as claimed by the relator.The former charter contained the usual general welfare cluuse followed by the usual enumeration of the specific powers which the city might exercise to accomplish the purposes set forth in the welfare clause. It contained substantially the same restriction which was held in State v. Hammond,MinnN. W to expressly limit the general grant of power contained in the welfare clause so that the city could exercise only those powers specifically enumerated and set forth. It gave specific power to regulate the liquor traffic but not to prohibit such traffic; consequently it did not confer the power to prohibit. Relator contends that because the present charter continued in force all powers previously possessed by the city, the power of the city to control the liquor traffic is still subject to the same limitations placed upon it .